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ABSTRACT
It is widely acknowledged that the contemporary unemployment problem
is very largely a problem of unemployed unskilled workers.  This paper
argues (a) that high levels of unemployment and increasing dispersion in
the primary labour income distribution are intimately related; (b) that both
reflect the impact of the accumulation of technology on the job structure;
(c) skill shortages are to be explained in increasing part by limits to the
available stock of learning ability as well as to inefficiencies in training
institutions; (d) a sizeable quantum of existing unemployment arises
because the market clearing wage for people of low learning ability falls
below either a statutory minimum wage or the reservation wage as set by
the social security minimum; (e) adequate discussion of these hypotheses
is inhibited by a variety of taboos.
Going from analysis to prescription, the paper argues that the more
serious social problem is not unemployment per se, but the increasing
inequality of condition of which it is a symptom.  It seems particularly
important to stress this, given that about the only cure for unemployment
on offer seems to be greater "flexibility" -- reduction of worker-protection
"rigidities" -- which would increase inequality; making the cure worse than
the disease.
Seemingly utopian long-run cures are considered, primarily moving
towards a reasonably adequate universal citizen's income.  This so
redefines the rights and duties of citizenship that the necessary
redistribution is seen not as taking from the able and industrious to give to
the feckless, but as taking from the gifted lucky ones who can get satisfying
work, in order to give both to the unlucky ones who cannot work and to
those who could work -- but who choose to do other things.
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1.  Background
The interpretation of our current unemployment problems which
follows has never seemed to persuade any audience on whom I have tried
it out over the last 8 years.  The only variation is in the mix of incredulity,
embarrassment and outrage with which it is greeted.  This has led me to
wonder what peculiarity or defect of character it might be that causes me
to continue to find it the most plausible interpretation available.  I have
concluded that there might be several factors all stemming (a) from my
advanced age, and (b) from the fact that I have spent most of my life
studying the Japanese economy and society.  It might be as well to begin by
spelling out those factors -- to explain, as Americans say, where I'm
coming from.
1.1.  I am old enough to have heard Tawney give a public lecture,
somewhere around 1949, in which he celebrated the redistribution of
wealth which the Labour government's new taxation system would ensure.
It would, he said, have revolutionary implications in ending the inequalities
he had so eloquently written about.  Soon after that I went to Japan and saw
the effects of an even more drastic wealth redistribution.
But gross inequalities of condition are still there and are still a
central political issue in Britain, if less so in Japan.  But as compared with
the time when Tawney's Equality1 was published, asset ownership is,
indeed, a less obvious cause of inequality.  If one were to look for "two
nations" in the Disraeli sense today, where would one look for the dividing
line? When he spoke of the Rich and the Poor as being totally out of touch
with each other -- "no intercourse and no sympathy", "as ignorant of each
other's habits, thought and feeling as if they were dwellers in different
zones or inhabitants of different planets"2, he had in mind the gulf between
the aristocracy, gentry and professional and commercial upper middle class
-- some two per cent of the population, perhaps -- and the other 98 per
cent.  When the Clarendon Committee on the grammar schools started, a
couple of decades later, to estimate the size of the "middle class" that
needed grammar schools, they came up with a figure around five per cent.
Today's equivalent, in that dimension of "sympathy, habits, thought and
feeling", would presumably be the 20 per cent of the population who read
the quality papers and the rest who read what a journalist recently called the
tabloids and testosteroids or nothing. 
But that "taste and sentiment" dividing line would not today also, as
it was in Disraeli's time, be the most obviously significant dividing line in
2terms of asset ownership.  That line, surely, is the one which lies between
the 60 per cent who own their own home and a car, possibly a private
pension of some sort, and the 40 per cent who do not.
And -- the essential point -- both of today's dividing lines would
correspond, roughly, with the distribution of earned income.
What Tawney was celebrating in 1949, in other words, was the
arrival of meritocracy, the shift from a traditional society in which asset
inequality and inequality of unearned income from capital was the
dominant determinant of inequality of condition, to a society in which
inequalities of earned income are the dominant factor -- not only from an
increase in the labour share in GNP, but also from an increasing capture of
capital income by pension funds and insurance companies -- and ultimately
by the large numbers of people who have pensions and policies.
The shift parallels the common observation that in the production
process human capital has become steadily more important relative to
material capital.  Likewise, in generating income inequality, differences in
individual endowments of human capital are more important than
differences in endowments of wealth. 
1.2.  The second point concerns something which colours my thinking
about the factors which generate those increasingly important differences
in earning power.  I am old enough to have begun reading sociology during
the fifties when there was still a journal called the Eugenics Review, when
the relative role of nature and nurture in generating human differences was
still a lively topic of debate, when people still took the concept of
intelligence seriously.  That was the decade which saw the publication of
two of the most perceptive anti-utopias in which genetic endowments play
a crucial role -- Kurt Vonnegut's Player Piano, and Michael Young's Rise
of the Meritocracy, with its famous equation "Merit = IQ+Effort"
So I was also around to see the steady imposition of a taboo on such
discussions in the 1960s; the banishment of such concepts as "intelligence"
from the discussion of skills and ability, the marginalization into what were
generally labelled as right-wing ghettoes of psychologists such as Hans
Eysenck who persisted in discussing the heredity element in ability
differences, (all you need to do at the mention of such a topic is say "Yah!
Cyril Burt!") and the dwindling to a mere trickle of the only kind of
research which provides really substantial scientific evidence on the
nature/nurture question, namely the systematic comparisons of siblings and
identical twins reared together and reared apart. 
While I understand and sympathize with the generous concern for the
self-respect and dignity of the not-so-bright which lies behind this taboo,
and while being, personally, still strongly in favour of comprehensive
3rather than selective education at least until the mid-teens, the acceptance
of this taboo by academics has always seemed to me a sort of trahison des
clercs.  It seriously impedes the careful, and socially responsible, analysis
of important social problems.  
An example of what I would call social irresponsibility, or less
brutally an evasion of social responsibility, is the second pamphlet of the
Commission on Social Justice, The Justice Gap.  It not only maps the
pattern of inequality, it also discusses the way inequality is inherited from
generation to generation.  It suggests that equality of opportunity can be
made into a very radical ideal if it means changing society so that the most
disadvantaged get the same life-chances as the more fortunate.  It goes on
to say that the changes this would require can be very wide-ranging indeed,
and that education is the "crucial means".  
But how wide-ranging, and through what form of education, depends
crucially on what are the actual mechanisms of intergeneration
transmission.  How much of the variance in inherited opportunity is to be
attributed to the two factors that social intervention can operate to alter:
the economic factors -- some parents having more to spend on their
children than others -- or the cultural factors -- different parents using their
resources differently, giving exposure in the family to different qualities of
spoken language, expressions of different emotions, values and aspirations,
the content of different newspapers or TV programmes.  And how much of
the variance is, instead, to be attributed to genetic factors -- the fact that,
for all the regression towards the mean, brighter and more energetic parents
tend to have brighter and more energetic children.  
There are answers to that question.  The most authoritative one
known to me3 -- the result of a careful study of 2478 pairs of American
male twins on the National Academy of Sciences-National Research
Council twin registry -- concludes that, given the variations of
environments and of gene packages found in American post-war society,
"inequality of opportunity [defined so as not to "incorporate inequalities
of genotype"] accounts for less than 20 per cent of the variance in
outcomes.  [Occupational status, earnings, etc.]  Thus, equalizing
opportunities in this [environmental] sense would to a limited degree
equalize outcomes without necessarily requiring any inefficient
disincentives.  However, total family effects, including genetics, account
for about 60 per cent of the variance of outcomes."
The bulk of the people in that sample were born in the first half of
this century.  The odds are that for later generations the role of genetic
factors will be greater than that 40 per cent.  There has been a significant
increase in equality of educational opportunity, (how many people as bright
as Ernie Bevin would now leave school at 16, let alone 13?).  And any
4homogenization of environments reduces the role of nurture in explaining
differences in outcomes, and enhances that of nature.
In any case, it seems to me axiomatic that unless one takes seriously
that question about the relative importance of genetic as opposed to social
and cultural mechanisms -- and the available answers to it -- the designing
of educational systems or employment systems or welfare systems to break
the cycle of generational transmission -- to reverse the progressive
disconnection of the "underclass" from society (to use terminology which
again is taboo for members of the Commission on Social Justice) --
becomes impossible. The Justice Gap, observing the taboos, managed to
avoid the question completely.
1.3.  My third peculiarity, relevant precisely to the notion of "disconnection
from society" is a long history of trying to worry out the implications of
the contrast between British "individualism" and the Japanese sense of
community -- recently restimulated by getting to know more about both
American individualism and the Italian sense of community.  I have become
convinced that a key concept in all the discussion of the future of welfare
and social security systems -- not only for understanding, but also for
policy formulation -- is that of sharing.
If we are going to have a half-way decent society to live in, we are
going to have to have a good deal more sharing between the lucky and the
unlucky.  And the willingness to accept that sharing -- both the willingness
to give and the willingness to receive without feeling resentment -- depend
crucially on the sense of community, -- on fraternity, the third of the
French Revolution's trinity of virtues, too often forgotten in the British
preoccupation with the other two. 
It seems to me a pity that a rethink of the welfare state should take
place under the rubric of a Commission on Social Justice.  I can
understand, if not applaud, the Commission's valiant effort to stem the tide
of relativist ethics and reassert the Platonic realist view that there is such
a "thing" as social justice whose nature and implications it was the job of
the Commission to discover and lay bare.  But its first pamphlet which
tried to do this, succeeded only in showing the unreconcilable diversity of
individual ideas of fairness.  They do not begin to have a method for
reconciling by logic -- rather than by the persuasion of emotional appeal --
the difference between, say, Mr. A who says:
"the quarter million a year I can earn as a CEO, represents an
impersonal market valuation of my contribution to society, and
as such is a fair reward for my work.  The fact that people who
5make lesser contribution are sleeping in the streets is no reason
why I shouldn't keep every penny of it", 
and a Rawlsian Mr. B who says: 
"it's implausible that Mr. A would have chosen that
distributional arrangement behind a veil of ignorance as to
what sort of slot he would occupy in society.  Therefore, in all
fairness, he should not argue as he does", 
or Mr. C who says something similar in more simple words: 
"my idea of fairness concentrates on effort.  People should not
be rewarded simply for their luck in being bright and able to
make a social contribution that the market values more highly
than others.  Equal efforts to use such talents as one has should
get equal rewards.
That philosophical disagreement will stretch to the end of time. But
around which of these versions the predominant consensus in any society
will in practice converge is a question determined by social factors, among
which the sense of community and the willingness to share (preferably
from sentiments of fraternalism rather than the charitable paternalism
which Mrs. Thatcher advocated) are overwhelmingly important.
The willingness to share and an acute sense of fairness are not the
same thing.  It is a safe bet that, if asked to share the rewards the market
gives them, Messrs. A, B and C would all prove to be more willing to share
with a close family member than with a distant cousin, and more willing
to share with a distant cousin than with any old Tom, Dick or Harriet.
Measurements of "social distance" played a prominent part in the first
sociology textbooks I read in the 1950s, and they remain crucial for the
discussion of welfare and the possibilities of redistribution.  The extent of
fellow-feeling within a social group, the sense among fellow-citizens that
they belong to a national community, is what determines the willingness
to share, to accept taxation to increase the social wage or transfer
purchasing power.  What concept of fairness, of justice, predominates is a
function of the degree to which that sense of community is actually
present, it is not the fundamental starting point.
Justice becomes the only starting point left, if one accepts that the
sense of community has been fatally eroded to vanishing point, and we
have become a society of atomised individualistic individuals. I fear that
the fact that it has become the fundamental starting point for the work of
6the Commission on Social Justice, does indeed reflect such an assumption.
There is a contrast between the very vocal concern of the Italian and
German left with the possibilities of transforming class solidarity into
social solidarity4, and the continued preoccupation of the Labour Party
with individual rights and entitlements -- the fact that the defenders of the
National Health Service, for instance, don't have much to say about its
symbolic importance as social bond -- as "our" health service.  In this, it
seems to me, the Italians are closer to getting it right and the Labour Party
to getting it wrong. 
Perhaps the Labour Party had no other place to go, given that the
Christian Socialist strain in Labour Party collectivism which had its heyday
in the late 1940s always was a minor theme.  The authors of the SCPR
reports on British social attitudes remark that their surveys confirm that
"class interest, and not moral values (such as attitudes to welfare
dependency) is the most important factor dividing the parties in British
politics.  Of the 18 statements which most sharply divided Labour from
Conservative supporters in 1985 and 1986, 14 were to do with class
interest -- the other 4 were to do with nuclear weapons on British soil and
socialist planning versus private enterprise"5.
But I do not believe that we have to give up.  I do not think we should
abandon society -- community -- to the individual.  The British left has
enjoyed pouring scorn on Mrs Thatcher's famous "there is no such thing as
society", but what is it doing to prevent her assertion becoming a true
prediction?  We need to think seriously about the means -- the "social
engineering means" if you like -- of reconstituting it.
1.4.  The final peculiarity which has shaped my perceptions of the
employment problem is a deep interest in one of the crucial mechanisms of
meritocracy -- the role of educational selection ("credentialism") in modern
industrial societies.  No student of Japanese society could fail to be
interested in such matters.  In my case that interest, stimulated in Japan,
was carried over into subsequent research in Sri Lanka and other
developing countries and resulted in a book entitled The Diploma Disease.
The thesis of that book is briefly:
More and more of the worthwhile "jobs" in modern societies
are part of a patterned "career".
People are selected for careers relatively early in life -- by employing
organizations, or by the institutions which offer the vocational courses
leading to career-licensing qualifications -- increasingly on the basis of
their educational qualifications.
7Those educational qualifications are increasingly used less as
measures of what people have already learned than as surrogate measures
of an individual's position in the spectrum of learning abilities -- more or
less correlating, in most definitions of the term, with "intelligence".  That
is why a first in classics is as good a qualification as a first in economics
for a job -- or rather a career -- in the Treasury.  And that is why, in
selection for nurses' training courses or engineering technician courses in
Britain, a GCSE credit in vocationally relevant subjects like domestic
science or mechanical drawing cuts very little ice.  Selectors look rather at
scores on the more "intellectually rigorous" English and Maths exams.
Because of its insistence on the importance of individual differences
in innate learning abilities, this thesis also runs up against the taboos
mentioned earlier, and that is presumably why the relevant literature,
mostly dating from the 1970s, is largely ignored.  One of the most subtle
attempts to model the processes by which pay and occupation are
determined, taking account of natural abilities, is to be found in the
concluding chapter of Henry Phelps-Brown's Inequality of Pay6, a chapter
which builds on an earlier Keynes lecture by James Meade7.  The social
science citations index turns up only one reference to Phelps-Brown's book
in the last three years.  The book was not to be found in the library which
was inherited by the LSE's Centre for Economic Performance from the
Centre for Labour Economics.
The way in which these considerations relate to what follows on
unemployment will become obvious.
2.  Modern Unemployment
I would suggest:
1.  That the form of unemployment we have in Europe today is in
many important respects different from the mass unemployment of the
1930s -- not very controversial.
2.  That there is only limited possibility of making a dent in the
unemployment figures by macroeconomic demand management, or by
incomes policies and other forms of flexibilization of labour markets.
3.  That there are equally limited possibilities of making much impact
on the employment intensity of new investment in particular or of the
industrial structure in general -- through selective tax or credit incentives,
educational initiatives, regional development policies or whatever. 
84.  That the main driving force of change which is producing our
problem is the steady accumulation of technological knowledge and its
impact on the structure of jobs.  There is a steady and inexorable increase
in the number of jobs which only those with high levels of brain power can
learn how to do, and simultaneously a diminution in the number of jobs
which almost anybody can learn how to do.  The relation between the
number of job offers for the latter type of jobs, and the number of people
who are not equipped with the necessary skills -- and are not equipped with
the mental abilities or habits to acquire the skills -- for any but that kind of
job, causes the market-clearing rate for that kind of job to fall, (while,
almost everywhere, the shortage of people able to learn to do the difficult
jobs drives their wages steadily upwards).  In societies where there is no
guaranteed social security minimum income, (e.g., the US) that fall in
bottom-level wage rates can be charted in the wage statistics very clearly.
In societies like ours with a social security floor, the jobs that would only
be offered at a wage below that floor don't get offered, and the result is
secularly rising unemployment. 
5.  The statement of the "trend" in the last paragraph in terms of "jobs
which only those with a high level of brain-power can learn how to do" and
"jobs which almost anybody can learn how to do" is a crude
dichotomization of what is really a spectrum of jobs and change is
occurring all the way along the spectrum.  A nurse has now to learn about
a much wider range of procedures and drugs than nurses twenty years ago.
Bull-dozer drivers have to learn how and when to punch and pull a much
larger set of buttons and levers, and the damage their mistakes can do with
their ever-more-powerful machines is increasing.  Typists have to learn a
new word processing package every two years, if not more often.  To be
sure, "learning ability" isn't everything.  There is still a great range of
abilities required for the good performance of the jobs our economy offers
-- social skills and personal "presence"; altruistic caring qualities; thick-
skinned toughness; the conscientiousness to follow precise instructions;
imagination.  But I would argue that the increasing complexity of our
society -- the increasing complexity of our social -- organizational --
technology as well as our material technology -- is steadily increasing the
importance attached to learning ability/intelligence relative to other factors,
all the way down the line.
6.  Import competition from (predominantly the labour-intensive
manufacturing sectors of) low-wage developing countries accentuates the
process of shift in the job structure to more learning-requirement-intensive
jobs, though it is not the prime cause thereof8.
7.  The rate at which the "learning burden" of the average job
increases may be reasonably assumed to vary with the proportion of their
9collective GNP the rich countries spend on R&D.  That ratio -- currently
edging up from two to three per cent -- is increasing at an accelerating rate,
as a result of the obsession of national policy-makers with their nation's
"competitiveness".  Hence, the metaphor "progressive disease" in the title
of this paper.
People with long memories are sceptical of this thesis.  An American
economist comments:  "This is not the first time that papers like yours have
been written.  In 1961-3 there was a wave of forecasts that unemployment
could never fall again (i.e. below 7 per cent!) because "automation" had
rendered many people unemployable.  It turned out not to be true, not
remotely true.  That does not make it false this time, but suggests caution,
anyway."9  It does, to be sure, but there are several pieces of evidence which
suggest that this time it might be different, and that the job structure is,
now, for the first time, beginning to push up against the limits of available
reserves of learning ability.
First, the pioneering statistical survey by the OECD of trends in the
dispersion of wages, published in the July 1993 Employment Outlook.
The United States stands out as having had the strongest trend for top
wages to rise and bottom wages to fall.  Britain follows. (These are pre-tax
figures, the primary income distribution.10) Overall, for the 17 countries
for which data is provided, it seems reasonable to conclude the following:
the more fluid (in OECD mid-1980s doctrine, "flexible") the labour
market -- i.e., the less wages are governed by convention or state
regulation or collectively bargained agreements, and the more rapidly
wages respond to changes in supply and demand and the marginal
productivity of labour -- the greater the growth in the gap between the
first and the ninth decile wage during the 1980s.  Some societies are
getting there faster, in other words, and they indicate where market forces
might, albeit more slowly, eventually push the other "stickier" societies
too.  
Secondly, there are the familiar facts about unemployment: 
-- a steady secular increase in almost every industrial society
from peak to peak and from trough to trough of the economic
cycle, an increase which looks less and less like "the impact of
the 1973 oil shock, the adjustment to which is still having
repercussions", as I heard someone bravely try to assert
recently,
-- an equally steady increase in the proportion of long-term
unemployed among the residual boom-period unemployed11 --
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and, though less well documented12, among the less-than
-one-year unemployed, an increase in the proportion of those
who seem condemned to a career of continuous oscillation
between very low paid jobs and unemployment,
-- a steady rise in the correlation between long-term
unemployment and low educational attainment13.  
Thirdly, there are other phenomena which reinforce the simple model
which sees the population as distributed along a dimension of what Phelps-
Brown in the book cited earlier called ATW, "ability to work", or what
might better be called ATAS -- "to acquire skills".  The German
apprenticeship system is a case in point.  More and more young people of
the academic attainment levels which previously led normally to
apprenticeships are going on to higher education. Apprenticeship schemes
are embracing more and more of the least academically able, formerly
excluded -- the 24 per cent of the male and 40 per cent of the female
workforce with no qualifications in 1975 had declined to 14 per cent and
22 per cent in 1988 and the process continues; there is now, particularly
with the demographic contraction of age groups, some kind of place on an
apprenticeship scheme for everybody.  But this, together with the changes
in the job structure is leading to much concern about "quality", to highly
controversial proposals for watered-down versions of the apprentice-
training programme for the less able, and to talk of a "crisis" in the
system14.
As someone who has spent most of his life studying Japan I am often
asked:  if what you say is true and a universal feature of industrial
societies, how is it that the Japanese have such low unemployment?  Are
you saying that the Japanese are smarter so that they are freed from these
ATW, or ATAS, constraints?
It is true that Japan has an exceedingly low unemployment rate even
five quarters into a recession.  In fact, in good times, complaints of a
shortage of labour are frequent.  But even there the difficulty of placing
children of low educational attainment (the 5 per cent who do not go on
from compulsory education to high school) is said by school counsellors
to be increasing.  (While more adaptable/able/willing illegal Pakistani and
Iranian immigrants can still get construction jobs in the recession.)
But so far this hardly shows up in the statistics.  Japan keeps a low
unemployment rate because of:
(a) a still-high growth rate -- fuelled by a manufacturing output
growth rate -- of the kind which more mature industrial societies like ours
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are unlikely ever to attain again.  By dint of capturing the markets of its
less competitive rivals, as well as generating domestic demand, it has
managed to combine higher than average productivity growth in
manufacturing with a lesser fall than average in the numbers employed in
that sector -- a benign cycle which staves off the "Baumol effect" which
plagues the rest of us -- the secular decline in whole-economy productivity
growth as more and more of the employed population shift into service
jobs with rates of technologically-induced productivity growth much lower
than those attained in manufacturing.
(b) a work-ethic, plus a stigmatisation of "living off welfare", which
keeps people at work even in the low-wage sector.  That ethic derives from
earlier periods of poverty; it is one which it is hard to see any affluent
society like ours reproducing -- even though manifestly, in our society,
people with satisfying jobs -- interesting, prestige -conferring,
power-wielding jobs -- are working harder now than they used to before
the growth of international trade and the arrival of Japanese imports made
us so concerned about our "competitiveness"15. 
(c) the job structure produced by any given level of per capita income
is dependent on the pattern of consumer demand.  Japanese consumers have
shown their willingness to buy more services of an anyone-can-learn-to-do
kind than in most other societies.  They pay higher prices for their petrol
for the sake of having two people clean their windscreens rather than one.
They pay in higher prices for the pleasure of being bowed onto department-
store escalators by deferential young ladies.  Though how long this will
happen as retail-sector competition hots up and discount stores appear is
problematic.
(d) there is also, I suspect -- especially after talking with the
counsellors who find jobs for the not-so-bright -- a greater tendency in
Japan to "employ out of kindness", especially in the small firm sector
which is much larger than ours.  It is also part of this, I think, that, thanks
to convention helped by a government minimum-wage, low-wage jobs are
paid somewhat above the market-clearing level. 
A further reinforcing consideration for the thesis is the evidence of
the progressive realization of what I called earlier the "credentializing"  or
"diploma disease" trend -- the tendency for access to jobs to depend on
performance in general academic education. Sample bits of evidence:
-- the institution and then modification of entrance
examinations at Oxbridge, the all-nation character of the
competition to get to those universities, the increasingly
selective decisions of school-teachers when judging who is
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bright enough to be "put in for" those universities, and the
correspondingly increasing value of an Oxbridge degree in the
occupational competition.
-- the extension of that process more widely; the
systematization of a much more finely graded hierarchy of
universities, as publication of the "A-level points average" of
each year's entering cohort becomes increasingly important as
a determinant of a university's "standing" (and its graduates' job
chances) attracts more and more attention and "A-level points
average league tables" come to adorn the walls of -- and frame
the management objectives of -- more than one vice-
chancellor.
-- the increasing importance, at the university level of the "milk
round", at school level of employer-teacher contacts, reflecting
an increasing importance placed by large organizations which
can recruit for career employment, on "getting the right human
material".
-- as with employing organizations, so with professional
bodies. We see a continuation of the process which has been
going on for a century -- a steady escalation of the entrance
qualifications for various professional bodies.  More move
from A-level to graduate recruitment, from O-level to A-level
recruitment.  As a major driving force behind the steady
lengthening of general education -- the expected doubling of
numbers in higher education, for instance -- this may be a good
thing.  But note that the escalation of qualifications is not so
much the result of a conviction on the part of the councils of
the professional bodies that, say, the knowledge or mental
capacities gained in a university education are essential to job
performance.  It is, rather, the result of competition to maintain
the status of the profession vis-a-vis others by tapping, in their
recruitment, the highest possible level of the "pool of talent".
  
They can be surer than they ever were before that the assumption
underlying the qualification-escalation tactic -- that the further people get
in the general educational system the brighter they are -- is a more plausible
assumption than ever before as a result of: 
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(a) far greater equality of educational opportunity among the nation's
children.  Even if the differential chances of children brought up in the
unskilled working and the children from the chattering classes are great
(and likely to grow greater as the mechanisms of assortive mating and
genetic inheritance go to supplement those of cultural and economic
inheritance),  the extent to which Oxbridge creams the nation's children and
not just the children of a limited social class has vastly increased.  (The
point made earlier about increased equality of opportunity a propos of
Ernie Bevin; considering only the last 40, rather than the last 80 years, one
could equally well cite John Major.)  And, 
(b) as a result, employers can be far more sure than they used to be
that the difference between someone with two passes at O-level and
someone with higher scores in six or seven subjects indicates a real
difference in the ability to learn on the job.
3.  Prescriptions:  Better VET
   So what follows? If this diagnosis of underlying trends and their
relation to unemployment is correct, what are the implications, and what
are the possible remedies?  
Everyone's favourite solution; better education and training.  It is rare
to find anything written by an economist on unemployment these days
which does not end with the pious declaration that -- short-term demand
boosts etc. apart -- the only long-term solution to our problems is to
improve our education and training.  But tackle them on it; ask them if they
really have faith in their solution.
One should be suspicious of polyanna recipes.  Its much admired
educational system and apprenticeship system has not prevented Germany
from unemployment edging up to double figures even before the recent
recession, and recent German discussion (guarded discussion) of the
changing efficacy of apprenticeship as the "quality" of intakes change
should give one further pause.
It will be clear from my preliminary remarks, that my scepticism
about the "better skill training" solution centres on the fact that its
advocates seem never to face up to "pool of ability" questions, the question
of exactly how elastic are the learning-ability constraints on efforts to
improve skills by improving the quality of family and school life, the
efficacy or intensity of instruction, or the incentives to learn. We surely all
are aware intuitively of the problem.  How many of us think that, given the
right opportunities, we could have learned to take on Bobby Fischer at
chess? I probably could not have made the grade as a nuclear power
engineer, even if I'd had any amount of extra tuition in maths.  Most of us
are aware not only of our present limitations but of the limits on what we
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might have been.  And yet we let pass a great deal of nonsense about
education which is implicitly predicated on the notion that anyone can be
taught anything.  I think the reason lies in the taboos that I talked of earlier,
the squeamishness which accounts for the near-disappearance of words like
"intelligence" and "brain-power" and "employability" from educationalists'
daily talk. To repeat, one can appreciate the kindly concern for the dignity
and self-esteem of the not-so-bright which accounts for it.  The trouble is
that in seeking equality of esteem, we fail to do what we could do for
greater equality of life circumstances.   
The squeamishness can lead to culpable cant.  One of the best
examples I know is an advertisement on which the MSC spent thousands
of pounds at the time when the Youth Training Scheme was being extended
to two years.  Full page spreads showed an attractive 17-year-old with a
computer manual under her arm.  The caption was "Look out Japan.
Lindy's coming".  Everybody in the business knew that YTS was pretty
universally a last resort for those who were unwilling or unable to stay in
school, but couldn't get either an apprenticeship or a "proper job".  Only in
areas where youth unemployment was over 40 per cent (such as
Motherwell where I was doing survey work on the YTS at the time) did one
find a small number on the scheme with two or three "good passes" at O-
level. Manifestly, few young people with the mental ability to acquire high
tech skills were ever going to find themselves on a YTS scheme.      O f
course better education and training is important, but where are the studies
which demonstrate how it works? The mechanism is not helping the Lindys
to leap into one of the jobs in the top half of the ability/pay range for which
there is a skill shortage.  It must be something like this.  Imagine all the
jobs in the economy ranked in terms of a single dimension of
"skill-learning requirements".  There are shortages of qualified people for
most of the jobs in the 85th percentile and upwards.  Perhaps somebody in
a 70th percentile job could be trained for one of those.  And perhaps
somebody in the 50th percentile could learn enough to take over his job,
and so on down the line until somebody in the 5th percentile job moves up
to the 15th and makes way for somebody who is unemployed.
This "bumping up" model clearly needs a lot of clarification.  It is
exceedingly hard to sort out because the notion of "ability hierarchy" gets
entangled with the notion of "career track progression". The observable
variable, "deployable skill of this person now", (Phelps-Brown's ATW --
ability to work -- or Marshall's "personal efficiency of the worker") is a
function of the innate skill -- learning endowment, plus extra-family
education and training, plus extra-family education and training.  One
expects that continuing work experience would raise the ATW somewhat
anyway, the more so the "higher" (still in skill-learning requirement terms)
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the career entry level -- though this only within ever-narrowing career
tracks up this putative hierarchy.  (A redundant accountant who seeks to
become a professional footballer carries over very little of his accumulated
skills.)  The "bumping up" model assumes that some additional VET effort
raises the level of a person's ATW (within the total spectrum of ATWs)
further and/or faster than would be the case with a normal cumulation of
work experience and standard retraining.  To do the research which seems
urgently needed to assess the real pay-off of training, and to inquire into the
reality or otherwise of "ineluctable skill-learning-ability constraints", one
has to begin by sorting out what are -- absent intervention -- the normal
career tracks.
Such research has to be on case-study lines, requires the collection
of new data and cannot be conducted simply by the manipulation of
available statistics on e.g., the "success rates" of training schemes.  It is
crucial research, however -- crucial because, if it seems that there is a wide
variation in the efficacy of training, and that this variation is related to the
learning-ability of those who receive it -- if, in other words there is
evidence that the learning-ability constraints are indeed important but often
ignored, this will have important policy implications.  For example, in the
case of public expenditure, it will make obvious the need to look into the
usefulness of diagnostic tests to assess would-be trainees' likelihood of
"making it".  It will underline also the right of trainees who are in some
way paying for their own training to have such independent diagnoses as
are available, and not have to rely on the glib promises of training-
providers who have a clear self-interest in keeping their trainee numbers
up.
 Moreover, if diagnostic tests are deemed desirable, that has
implications for standards and qualifications.  You cannot have a
diagnostic test without some clear specification of the expected outcomes
of training -- which specification the National Council on Vocational
Qualifications seems currently bent on making as fuzzy and as assessor-
variable as possible! 
4.  Alternative Prescriptions:  Active Labour Market Policies, etc.
If it turns out that the efficacy of better education and training is
limited, there are, of course, the other seven of the eight proposals which
the Financial Times tells us the OECD is about to suggest as solutions for
the unemployment problem16:  nurture an entrepreneurial climate; enhance
the diffusion of technological knowledge; increase wage and labour cost
flexibility; reform job security provisions; increase working time
flexibility; encourage a switch from passive to active labour market
measures, and reform benefit systems to increase work incentives.
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Well, yes, the list is familiar.  We can guess roughly what the
maximum pay-off from the job-security, flexibility, benefit-system reform
measures will be -- getting down from a European 10-12 per cent
unemployment level to an American 6-7 per cent level with far more
poverty and social deterioration.  Active labour market policies?  Yes,
indeed, Sweden was the finest exemplar, but the slashing of social
expenditures and the rise in unemployment from two per cent to eight or
nine has shown just how much this was a function of public-sector make-
work which even the Swedes decided they could no longer afford.  Hours-
reduction and job-sharing?  The enlightened have been advocating this for
more than a decade, but so far with little result.  It is not only that the
leisure/money trade-off shows a declining relative value for leisure as the
work-hour average declines below 40.  Much less discussed (again, the
taboos) is the likelihood that employers will judge it improbable that the
1/2-person whom they bring in from the unemployed work force -- even if
the state pays the training cost -- will be less capable of learning to do the
job well than the person already doing it, half of whose time the employer
would lose.  (And he will make that probabilistic judgement on the wholly
justified grounds that the unemployed are on average less able than the
employed.) 
5.  Long-Term Problems:  Long-Term Solutions
For all the OECD's whistling in the dark, it is hard to feel faith in any
of the currently offered solutions.  If I am right about the progressive
nature of the unemployment disease we surely have to begin to ask
ourselves:  how shall we, in the year 2020, say, succeed in maintaining a
society based on what Andrew Britton recently succinctly described17 as the
Beveridge assumptions,
 
for those who are able, work is both a duty and a right.  It is the
basis on which most individuals participate in the community,
a source of their social life as well as of their standard of
living.     
By then, surely it will have become impossible.
The alternatives would seem to be:
(a) Maintain our present link between citizenship -- first-class
citizenship -- and participation in paid work, and create the sort of divided
society depicted in Michael Young's Rise of the Meritocracy or Kurt
Vonnegut's Player Piano, in which the divisions are tempered only by
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welfare transfers of cash to the second-class citizens, and all dignity is
denied.          
(b) Do something which may not be so very different in terms of
economic structure but which could be very different in political and social
implications.  Seek to break that link between citizen dignity and
participation in paid work.  The idea of a basic citizen's income has been
around a long time.  Thanks to James Meade and a slowly growing group
of academics grouped around the Citizen's Income Research Group, it has
been recently gaining wider currency. Ralf Dahrendorf recently gave it an
airing in the Financial Times18, stressing the advantages of fiscal and
administrative simplicity, avoiding means tests which are both demeaning
and an invitation to fraud.
The strongest argument for working, eventually, towards a situation
in which something like forty per cent of GNP is distributed as a basic
citizen income seems to me to be that which sees the dignity and self-
respect of individual citizens19 as an essential precondition for "re-knitting
the fabric of society", creating some sense of community and the
conditions for a decent polity.
The horrendous fiscal problems of moving to the level of
redistribution involved boggle the mind.  The slow transfer of capital
resources to a national fund so that the basic income is paid partly out of
capital income and only partly by redistribution of labour income would
seem to be an essential part of any solution, and it is interesting that the
OECD report on unemployment is said to be going to urge more taxation
of capital income (though in this case for the primary purpose of reducing
payroll costs to create employment)20.
How does a basic income produce these benign "dignity effects"?  In
the first place because, although those still capable of taking part in the
paid economy would be richer as well as doubtless having a more
interesting life, the fact that those living quietly on their citizen's income
would include eccentrics and poets and those who hate being organized as
well as those not bright enough to get a paid job should take away the
indignity, but still make it possible to maintain some kind of social
solidarity.
But that alone would not be enough.  It seems to me -- and see earlier
remarks about "community" -- that an essential accompaniment of a new
citizen right to an income would be a new definition of citizen duty.  The
introduction of some kind of universally obligatory community service
seems to me a necessary accompanying measure. It could be highly
concentrated in the late teens or spread throughout adult life, but an
essential element, to maximise the extent to which such service is not only
a symbolic recognition of the claims of community, but also a means of
18
opening up personal acquaintanceship networks, would be some kind of
social class-mixing teenage dormitory life of the kind the old national
service involved.  Only thus could one maximise the extent to which such
service is not only symbolic recognition of the claims of community, but
also a means of opening out personal acquaintanceship networks.
The other key part of an attempt to rebuild community would be to
stick to comprehensive schools, and restrain by fiscal measures the growth
of private education.  (If abolition or nationalisation of the public schools
could not get on to the agenda of the 1945 Labour government, nothing
but a desperate social crisis would make it thinkable now.  Besides, it is
difficult to draw the line between -- unacceptably -- saying to parents:  "you
can spend your money on bingo or a BMW, but you may not spend it on
your child's education", and, much more acceptably, saying:  "you can
spend your money getting your child extra education outside the common
school, but not on buying social exclusiveness".  (In fact, social
exclusiveness and intellectually superior education usually go hand in
hand.)
Keeping primary and secondary education as universal and as
unsegregated as possible cannot be done, now, after our twenty-year
experiment, while maintaining the pretence of the proponents of the
original move to comprehensive schools that the change was totally
costless because the intellectual development of the brightest children will
not suffer.  Streaming clearly favours the bright, and the concern of Tory
governments to reintroduce selective education stems as much from a
concern with national competitiveness  and  from class interest -- even
though all the surveys show that it is the bottom half of our population
whose learning performance falls behind that of competitor nations, not the
top half.
The question is not simple.  It might even be that a small dose of
selective education for the very very bright could enhance the sense of
community.  Probably, the closest approximation to Platonic Guardians on
earth at the moment are the hard-working, ill-paid, proud if not sometimes
downright arrogant, Japanese elite bureaucrats.  In a society which has
unstreamed schooling in neighbourhood schools or highly mixed income
composition up to the age of 15, they come increasingly from a tiny group
of schools, accommodating not much more than one per cent of the age
group, which select at age eleven, strictly by academic merit -- schools
whose fees vary but in quite low range so that one really can talk of
rationing by ability rather than by the purse21.  These schools - fewer than
thirty of them in a population of 120 million -- have a little bit of the ethos
of eliteness and social responsibility of the nineteenth-century British
public schools which bred the Indian civil service -- pious arrogance which
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we now scorn.  Perhaps, after a decade and a half in which Thatcherites
have been doing their best to rubbish the notion of public service as well
as of society, we can now, again, do with a little bit of that piety, even at
the price of arrogance.  What both Plato and Confucius realised -- that a bit
of elitism is the price of community -- we have been trying desperately for
half a century to forget.
How far institutional changes of this kind would genuinely change
social values in such a way as to put more weight on duties as compared
with rights and whether that would, in the long term, work against crime
and in many other ways improve the quality of life are matters on which
one can only speculate, but a subject on which speculation and examination
of the evidence (the connection between the greater duty-orientation of a
Japan or a Sweden and their lower crime rates, for instance) seems to me
urgent.  It is a subject even more sadly neglected than the fiscal problems
of moving to a basic-income society.
One reason for this is that many of those who are actively promoting
the notion of a basic citizen's income (the Citizens Income Trust is a very
catholic organization) come to it from the tradition of "claimant activism".
All their stress is on an extension of citizen's rights.  Talk of national
service is seen as reactionary talk, to be heard in its benign form only from
the more fuddy-duddy type of one-nation Tories, in its tougher forms only
from the advocates of boot-camps etc. to deal with juvenile crime.  That
seems to me fundamentally mistaken.  The fiscal arrangements necessary
for a basic citizen's income absolutely require a stronger sense of
community than currently exists; and that sense of community cannot be
created without a stronger sense of citizen duty counterbalancing citizen
rights.
6.  Objections
There are three major arguments which might be advanced to suggest
that the remedy for unemployment suggested above (basically fund it
differently and define it differently in value terms) is so pushing against the
tide of history as to be hardly worth bothering with.
1.  The whole trend of the last three centuries of European history has
been for increasing social mobility and fragmentation of traditional
communities, increasing complexity of the division of labour and
increasing diversity of individuals' "role portfolio", all leading to
increasing individuation and increasing individualism.  Why should this
trend be reversed?
2.  The measures I propose for "engineering" a revival of community
all presuppose an enhanced role -- in fiscal redistribution, in the
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organization of community service -- for the state.  As the economy moves
to ever-increasing global borderlessness, as the significance of national
frontiers steadily diminishes -- and nowhere more obviously than in
Europe after the single market -- how can national-states ever acquire that
power?
3.  The argument flies in the face of all we know about "hegemonic
ideologies".  How is it possible that a society dominated by the able
workaholics who still participate in the paid economy will sustain a
consensual value system which does not accord their activity the highest
possible place?
These are, indeed, non-trivial objections, but  there  are  answers --
I cannot say overwhelmingly conclusive answers, but answers -- to all of
them.
As for the first, one should -- without invoking post-modernism, end-
of-ideology or end-or-history arguments -- beware of assuming that all
historical trends are unilinear.  There are also cycles in history, and there
are already signs that the extreme boost to individuating tendencies in the
Thatcher-Reagan 1980s has evoked a counter-trend. Joe Rogaly, one such
trend-spotter, cites not only the publication by the Institute of Economic
Affairs(!) of David Green's Reinventing Civil Society, but also Virginia
Bottomley's attempt, as Health minister, to ban the word "market" when
talking of health service reform22.  The Guardian, recently rephrasing the
early 1980s battle of the wets and the dries, speaks of an eternal struggle
among conservatives "to reconcile a belief in free markets with a
recognition of the importance of community" and credits John Major's
government with trying to redress the imbalance of the "there is no such
thing as society" Thatcher years23.  The first number of the new journal
Demos has a powerful article on America's future by Amitai Etzioni, the
sociologist founder of the Society for the Advancement of
Socioeconomics, which argues (primarily a propos American society) the
need to re-discover the importance of "education to build character" - in
the sense of creating the capacity to restrain immediate impulse  (to the end
not only of "postponing gratification" in order to increase it, but also of
showing consideration for others, doing one's duty or obeying internalised
moral principles).  He argues this in part explicitly as a means of recreating
community.  Inter alia he too argues for compulsory community service,
and claims that it is gaining support from "more and more policy makers"24.
Absolutely crucial for the long-run future of these trends will be the
concern of the middle-classes with rising crime rates.  This, when
politicians are not busy bickering over who raised tax rates most, has
become the dominant political issue in both major Anglo-Saxon societies,
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the societies in which individualism is most advanced. Horror pictures of
the society of the future are beginning to appear more frequently:
Fifty years ago, the notion of most middle-income earners
having their properties protected by an alarm would have been
diagnosed as a phobia akin to obsessive hand-washing.  By the
end of the first decade of the 21st century those who can afford
it will have the bodyguards, the razor wire and the dogs; those
who cannot will work in the black economy in which weapons
and crack are the units of currency.  People will carry
handguns, legal or not (the present conditions for a handgun
licence being that you are a homeowner with a lockable filing
cabinet).  No responsible parent will ever allow their child out
unaccompanied. Nice young couples will play bridge by
videophone and every family will set its own curfew.  Your
car?  Bullet-proofed.  Your movements?  By day and through
decriminalised zones.  Your leisure?  Zen calisthenics, policed
by your own vigilante group ... 25
The authors' prescription.  Start reading.  "Start with Auden `We must learn
to love one another or die.'"
Maybe, but not all extrapolations predict the future.  Michael
Howardian repression may work, and in any case the poor and the desperate
have the habit of inflicting most of their injuries on each other.  Go
through Georgetown to the white suburbs and, in Washington city with one
of the highest crime rates in the world, you see fewer burglar alarms than
you do in Brighton, England.  It is beyond my powers of prediction to say
whether the creeping, undramatic increase in crime rates will ever be
enough to bring the enormous switch in public consciousness necessary
to make the reconstruction of community the major objective of any
political party. Just think what it will take for typical Daily Telegraph
readers to resign themselves to sending their children to a state
comprehensive and delaying their university education with national
service.  That may be all right for the Italians, the French and the Germans
who still have national service, but -- well, maybe it is true that in our
more class-ridden society it is just a bit harder for a Telegraph or Times
reader to love a Sun reader than it is to generate fellow-feeling between
readers of Le Monde and Paris Soir, or of Corriere and Il Giorno.  But is
that partly because they still have national service?  Which is chicken and
which is egg, and where do you start if you have neither?
As for the increasing porousness of the nation-state, while it is true
that the sense of national community was never higher in Britain than
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during the second world war, and has progressively declined since, there is
no inevitable connection between the sense of community and the sort of
belligerent patriotism evoked by threats to the nation-state.  The way in
which the minimally community-conscious Mrs Thatcher was also
responsible for the intense revival of belligerent nationalism in the
Falklands War is evidence of that.  So also is the detachment of a strong
sense of community in the Swiss cantons from any nation-state
assertiveness on the part of the federated Swiss state (though not, to be
sure, from pride in Swissness).  Would the relative cohesion of Scotland,
qua community, have remained as strong if Scotland had not been absorbed
into a United Kingdom?
There is, in other words, particularly in Europe, still the possibility
of building more local loyalties, of defining the community which confers
income rights, and claims the performance of citizen duties, in regional
terms not necessarily coinciding with existing nation-states.  Shifting the
emphasis of democratic accountability from the single five-yearly vote in
parliamentary elections to elections for local hospital, school and welfare
and environmental boards, as has been recently suggested as a response to
the increasing complexity of administration and consequent dominance by
technical experts26, is a measure obviously consonant with such an attempt
at decentralising democracy and decentralising community.  My impression
is that not much of the political science literature on federal states is
relevant to the assessment of this possibility, but some of it is.
As for the third point -- "hegemonic ideologies" -- a shift in values
seems to me not entirely impossible.  The crucial point is the dignity one,
preventing a first-class/second-class-citizen type of division between those
who are lucky enough to have the ability to get paid jobs and those who are
not so lucky, or choose not to use their abilities that way.  It would mean
making success in business or politics or administration something akin to
excelling in amateur athletics today.  Most people admire the effort,
without much envying the luck the champions had in being born with the
muscles and lungs that made the effort pay off.  As now for athletics, there
will obviously be differential material rewards attached to paid work, if
there is to be anything like market allocation of scarce talent, and
incentives other than honour for the effort which society will need to
evoke.
The inevitable difference from amateur athletics is that manifestly the
lucky ones will be the ones with the lion's share of power.  But, if our
democracy can sustain an effective independent press and television, a large
group of the clever ones will spend their time ferreting out and exposing
to the citizenry any self-interested abuse of power by the others.  One
cannot rule out the possibility that a shift from a definition of citizenship
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based on participation in paid work, to one based on basic income rights
and basic community duties, could be managed without an increase --
indeed, thanks to genuinely universal community service, with a decrease --
in the quantum of envy which social stratification inevitably generates in
any but the most stably traditional societies.
March 1994
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